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Differentiating Equations (2) and (3) with respect to a', the variance of the analysts' expectation of the consensus forecast error (eR), shows that the number of shares investors wish to buy and sell is decreasing in 2o. In Hayes' (1988) model, U2 is the only source of uncertainty; investors, however, are likely to face additional sources of uncertainty. In particular, uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of the consensus forecast. I define total uncertainty surrounding the earnings forecast to include both uncertainty surrounding the analyst's expectation of the consensus forecast error and uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of the consensus, and predict that: H2: Brokerage-firm trading in the forecast stock decreases in the total uncertainty of the forecast. (2) and (3). The figure presents the investors' trading demands n, (i.e., the difference between the investor's optimal holdings and his Hayes (1998), therefore, argues that the marginal return from analysts' efforts in gathering forecast information is greater for stocks that the analyst expects to perform relatively well. As a consequence, she predicts forecast accuracy will be greater for stocks that the analyst expects to perform well in the future. A test of H3 provides evidence on whether asymmetric trading incentives are likely to cause this behavior.
Hypothesis 2 is consistent with the common theoretical prediction that the extent to which investors trade on information decreases as the uncertainty of that information increases.2 Trading costs complicate the analysis. Figure 1 adapts Hayes' (1998, 303) diagram of the trading demands derived in Equations

Operationalizing the Theoretical Constructs
To test these hypotheses, I must identify empirical proxies for ILRI and total uncertainty. (5) N-L a=\ and SE is the sample squared error in the consensus forecast:
My proxy for |lRI is
In these equations, A is the actual earnings realization, F, is the forecast by analyst a, and F is the consensus forecast. I assign trading volume to the brokerage-firm(s) whose identification code accompanies a trade record.7 I then summarize brokerage-firm volume by calculating each firm's market share. Market share is the number of shares traded through the brokerage firm normalized by total shares traded in the stock. Specifically, the daily market share of brokerage firm j for stock k is the total volume traded by brokerage firm j in stock k on day i, divided by the total volume in stock k on day i. In Equation (7), the sum of brokerage-firm volume for all J brokers on the TSE represents total volume for stock k:
Broker Volumek, MKT_SHAREki= j .
(7) E Broker Volume.i j=l I also calculate buy-side and sell-side MKT-SHARE using only buy or sell trades, respectively. For example, a brokerage-firm's buy-side MKTSHARE represents the percentage of all purchases that occur in a particular stock-day executed by that brokerage firm. In untabulated tests, I find that MKTSHARE is significantly positively correlated with the number of shares traded by the brokerage firm (p = 0.71). MKT-SHARE is, therefore, strongly related to commission-based trading revenue, which is most often charged on a cents-pershare basis (Conrad et al. 2001 ). MKTSHARE has other desirable properties as a measure of brokerage-firm trading: MKTSHARE, unlike raw brokerage-firm volume, is not autocorrelated, and it is also uncorrelated with total trading in the stock; so exogenous changes in total stock volume cannot bias the empirical tests. Summing daily MKTSHARE over any period T produces the total broker MKTSHARE over that period.
The Sample
The TSE sample includes every trade of the largest 100 companies on the TSE between September 1, 1993 and August 31, 1994. These 100 companies represent a significant fraction of the market value of all Canadian-based public companies. Ninety-seven of the 100 companies in the sample are in the TSE 300, the TSE's primary index. These 97 companies make up 78.2 percent of the value of the TSE 300 and include 18 of the 20 most active issues on the exchange (Toronto Stock Exchange 1994).
I obtain analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations for the sample firms from the I/B/E/S International earnings forecast and recommendation databases. Over the sample period, the I/B/E/S detailed forecast database records a total of 1,224 forecasts of upcoming annual earnings (fiscal year one forecasts) whose issuing brokers also have recommendations on the I/B/E/S detailed recommendations tape. I delete 264 forecasts because the issuing broker was not a member of the Toronto Stock Exchange on July 31, 1993.8 In addition, to ensure that earnings announcements do not confound the results, I delete 125 earnings forecasts issued within five trading days before or after an earnings announcement.9 The final I/B/E/S sample consists of 835 analysts' earnings forecasts issued through 15 different brokerage firms on 96 of the 100 largest stocks on the TSE. 7 The TSE allows brokers to internalize (same broker buying and selling) trades. Therefore, some trades involve two brokers and others only one. 8 Most of the deleted forecasts were issued by U.S.-based brokers or brokers whose firm name in the 1993 TSE record could not be conclusively matched to a name in the I/B/E/S historical names file. In addition, I delete 33 forecasts made by the broker HSBC Securities, which is currently a member of the TSE, but was not a member firm according to TSE records on July 31, 1993 (Toronto Stock Exchange 1993). 9 The various news services reporting to Bloomberg supply the earnings announcement dates. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on brokerage trading and coverage activity for the 15 I/B/E/S sample brokerage firms in the 100 largest TSE stocks. The 15 brokerage firms constitute a diverse group that trade 54.8 percent of total MKT-SHARE in these stocks."' The table presents mean daily brokerage-firm volume (C$) and MKTSHARE per stock, the total number of sell-side analysts each brokerage firm employs (Number of Analysts), the number of sample stocks each brokerage firm covers (Number of Stocks Covered), and the number of sample forecasts (Number of Forecasts in Sample)." Brokerage firms with larger MKT-SHARE tend to cover more stocks. As a consequence, these brokers contribute more forecasts to the sample. All else equal, smaller firms will have less commission revenue available to support a research department. One brokerage firm covers just one sample stock, concentrating instead on small-and mid-cap stocks.
Event Windows
The statistical tests examine four event windows surrounding the release of the forecast:
1. Days -10 through -6 relative to the forecast date 2. Days -5 through -1 relative to the forecast date 3. Days 0 through +5 relative to the forecast date 4. Days +6 through +10 relative to the forecast date.
Discussions with analysts and research directors suggest that a two-week trading window likely captures the immediate effect of analysts' forecasts on investors' trading decisions. I examine period 2, days -5 through -1 relative to the forecast date, because analysts' forecasts could stimulate trading flow through their brokerages in this period if analysts release their forecasts to their best customers before they release them to I/B/E/S. Period 1, days -10 through -6, is a control period when no relation between ABSDEV and brokerage-firm trading should exist. Brokerage-firm market share should not be related to analysts' forecasts until the forecast has been prepared and released. Table 2 MARKET SHARE = Market Share is MKTSHARE,i from Equation (7) 
Key Independent Variables
IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS
Using data from each of the event windows described above, Table 3 Table 3 presents OLS estimates of Equation (8). 5 Overall, the results suggest that analysts' earnings forecasts can significantly increase their brokerage-firm's share of trading 12 Equation (7) shows how to calculate MKT-SHAREl, for each day i, brokerage firm j, and stock k. Mean Market Share is MKT-SHAREj, averaged first over time for each of the 428 unique brokerage firm-stock {j, k} pairs in the sample, then across the brokerage firm-stock pairs. '3 The units of the square root of the BKLS UNCERTAINTY measure are cents per share. 14 Excluding the industry dummy variables from the regression does not significantly affect any of the study's inferences. '5 The sample size in the day +6 through +10 period is 829 because analysts issue six forecasts in the last week of the sample year. These forecasts' event days +6 through +10 lie outside the sample period. in the forecast stock. The more an analyst's forecast differs from the consensus forecast, the greater the broker's market share in the two weeks after forecast publication. Specifically, the coefficient on ABSDEV is positive and significant at the 0.05 level in the day -5 through -1 period and the day +6 through +10 period and is significant at the 0.01 level in the day 0 through +5 period. Finding that the deviation between an analyst's forecast and the consensus forecast is associated with the brokerage's share of trading in the stock over days -5 through -1 (before the forecast is released) is consistent with Brown et al.
(1991), who find that analysts' clients can only trade profitably if clients receive analysts' forecasts prior to public release. I estimate the economic impact of forecast deviations from consensus by multiplying the coefficient on ABSDEV by its mean value (0.0069) and dividing by the number of days in the period. For example, the 4.28 coefficient on ABSDEV in the day 0 through +5 period represents an increase of 0.5 percent per day in brokerage market share, approximately a 10 percent increase in daily brokerage market share. The significance of ABSDEV in the day -5 through day -1 period is not robust to excluding day -1 from the regression. This finding suggests either that analysts leak the contents of their reports one day before public release, or that some I/B/E/S forecast dates are one day late.
The coefficient on UNCERTAINTY is negative and significant at the 0.10 level over the day 0 through 5 period and at the 0.0 level over the day thndrough +10 period.6 The greater the Barron et al. (1998) measure of total uncertainty surrounding upcoming annual earnings, the less trade an analyst's forecast generates for her brokerage firm. Multiplying the coefficient on UNCERTAINTY over the day 0 to +5 period by the mean of UNCER-TAINTY (0.18) and dividing by the number of days in the period shows that UNCERTAINTY, at its mean, decreases brokerage-firm market share by 0.2 percent per day. This result is consistent with the common theoretical prediction that magnitude of investors' trading is inversely associated with the level of uncertainty. Neither ABSDEV nor UNCERTAINTY is significant in the control period, days -10 to -6. These regression results are consistent with HI and H2.17 ABSDEV is associated with higher brokerage-firm market share, while UNCERTAINTY is associated with lower brokerage-firm market share in the two weeks after the forecast release date.18 Table 4 presents three regression results that extend our understanding of how analysts' forecasts affect brokerage-firm market share.
Aggregate Effects and below Consensus Forecasts
The first regression is a benchmark for the next two. The benchmark simply replicates the specification in Equation (8) using, as the dependent variable, the sum of a brokerage firm's daily MKTSHARE in the forecast stock over event days 0 through +10. Consistent with The second column of Table 4 tests whether a positive difference between an analyst's forecast and the consensus generates more trading than a negative difference of the same magnitude. Equation (9a) includes the variable ABSDEV x NEG, which estimates the slope shift in ABSDEV if the analyst's forecast is below the consensus. Hypothesis 3 predicts that analysts' forecasts that are below the consensus forecast have less effect on trading because short-sale constraints prevent many investors from trading on the negative information in these forecasts. Thus, H3 suggests the coefficient on ABSDEV x NEG will be negative. In alternative specifications, I used the 25th, 10th, and 5th percentiles of the forecast deviation from consensus to define ABSDEV X NEG. In every case, the coefficient on ABSDEV x NEG is insignificant. and indicates that, over the day 0 through +10 period, buy recommendations generate approximately 2.4 percent per day higher market share in the recommended stock than do hold recommendations, whose effects are implicit in te intercept. The coefficient on SELL is not significant, so sell recommendations do not generate significantly more trading than hold recommendations. However, an F-test of the equality of the BUY and SELL coefficients is rejected (p-value < 0.01). This result shows that the analyst's recommendation choice significantly affects brokerage market share in thest the stock in the two weeks after the forecast is released. Thus, both positive stock recommendations and earnings forecasts that deviate from the consensus can significantly increase brokerage-firm market share in the forecast stock. This finding is consistent with Francis and Soffer's (1997) conclusion that analysts' forecasts and recommendations both contain distinct price-relevant information. The difference between the effects of BUY and SELL recommendations on trades flowing through the analyst's broker is large, relative to the effects of deviations from the consensus forecast, ABSDEV. Thus, analysts can generate higher trading commissions through positive recommendations than with earnings forecasts that deviate from the consensus.
Analysts' Stock Recommendations and Buy-Side versus Sell-Side Broker Market Share
The TSE data show whether the broker was on the buy-side or the sell-side of a trade. Thus, I calculate each brokerage's daily buy-side MKT7SHARE from Equation (7), though using only stock purchases in the forecast stock. I calculate each brokerage's daily sellside MKTJSHARE from Equation (7) Table 6 examines whether an analyst's FORECAST ERROR is related to her brokeragefirm's market share of trading in the forecast stock. FORECAST ERROR is defined as the 22 The fact that the BUY coefficients are conditioned on the same information (i.e., the independent variables are identical in both regressions) allows me to construct a difference-in-means test using the estimated coefficients and standard errors from Equations (lOa) and (lOb). 23 Do buy recommendations increase brokerage-firm trading, or do analysts issue buy recommendations on stocks their brokerage-firms trade heavily? The event-study research design in the paper is limited in its ability to answer this question. In untabulated tests, I examine brokerage-firm trading in the period before the analyst's forecast is released, event days -10 through -2. I find that average daily MKTSHARE for both buy and sell recommendations is significantly lower in the prior period than in the period from event day 0 through +10 (pvalue < 0.01), and that MKT-SHARE for favorable (buy and strong buy) recommendation is insignificantly different than for unfavorable (hold, sell, or strong sell) recommendations (p-value = 0.16). These results suggest that analysts' recommendations cause brokerage-firm trading to increase. However, a full examination of the direction of causality is left for future work.
The Accounting Review, January 2004 The results in Table 6 indicate that MKTJSHARE is not positively related to forecast error. Estimating Equation (11) shows that FORECAST ERROR is marginally negatively related to SUMSHARE (p-value = 0.10). This finding indicates that larger absolute forecast errors reduce the amount of trading that the analysts' brokerage-firm executes in the forecast stock. The coefficient on BUY is positive (p-value < 0.01). Thus, after controlling for forecast error, analysts' buy and strong buy recommendations still significantly increase their brokerage-firms' market share.
The Accounting Review, January 2004
The results in Table 6 suggest that biasing forecasts is unlikely to increase analysts' trading-related compensation. Thus, I interpret this result as suggesting that issuing buy and strong buy recommendations is a more effective way for analysts to increase their tradingrelated compensation than biasing their forecasts.24'25 V. CONCLUSION Using data on brokerage-firm trading from the Toronto Stock Exchange, I examine how analysts' earnings forecasts and their stock recommendations affect their employers' share of trading in the forecast stocks. Analysts' earnings forecasts can significantly increase brokerage-firm market share in the two weeks after the forecast release date. I find that: (1) consistent with Hayes (1998), the further an analyst's earnings forecast diverges from the consensus forecast, the greater the analyst's brokerage-firm's market share of trading, and (2) consistent with the common theoretical prediction that greater uncertainty about the accuracy of a forecast reduces investors' trading, the higher the total uncertainty surrounding the analyst's earnings forecast, the lower the analyst's brokerage-firm's market share of trading.
Contrary to Hayes' (1998) contention, I find that analysts' forecasts below the consensus forecast do not generate less trading commission revenue for the analysts' brokerage firms than do analysts' forecasts above the consensus. I also find no evidence that analysts can generate trade by adding error to their earnings forecasts. Forecast errors produce no significant effect on brokerage-firm market share. However, analysts' buy and strong buy recommendations generate significantly higher trading-commission revenue than other recommendations. I conclude that analysts are more likely to generate trading commissions for their employers by making favorable stock recommendations rather than by upwardbiasing their earnings forecasts.
My study generates a set of empirical results that can guide refinements of theory on how trading incentives affect analysts' forecasts and recommendations. To reiterate, I find that analysts' forecasts and stock recommendations exert a significant effect on their brokerage-firms' market share of trading in the forecast stock. This result strengthens the link developed by McNichols and O'Brien (1997) and Hayes (1998) between analysts' actions and their trading-related compensation. Moreover, this result is consistent with Hayes' (1998) contention that the distance of an analyst's forecast from the consensus forecast predicts investors' trading. However, my results are inconsistent with Hayes' (1998) contention that analysts' forecasts below the consensus forecast generate less trading commission revenue than do analysts' forecasts above the consensus. Finally, I report the unpredicted result that analysts' buy recommendations increase both buying and selling market shares of trading through the analysts' brokerage-firms.
I cannot observe directly whether analysts are biasing their forecasts. As a result, my conclusion that trading incentives are unlikely to affect analysts' forecasts is based partly on the indirect evidence obtained from analyzing ex post forecast errors. Neither can I observe trading by investors who receive an analyst's earnings forecast or stock recommendation and choose to trade with a different brokerage-firm. Thus, my results should not be interpreted as representing the total effect of analysts' forecasts and recommendations on their investors' trading. Despite these limitations, my study establishes that investors 24 I find similar results using SUMBUY or SUMSELL as the dependent variable in Equation (11). 25 Including ABSVAR and UNCERTAINTY in the regression specification does not affect the inferences. If included in the regression, then the coefficient on ABSVAR is always significantly positive, but the coefficient on UNCERTAINTY is not significant. The insignificant coefficient on UNCERTAINTY is due to the correlation between UNCERTAINTY and FORECAST ERROR.
Irvine trade on the information in analysts' forecasts, and that analysts' favorable stock recommendations increase their employers' market share of trading in the recommended stock. Thus, my results suggest that, as long as the amount of trading done by their employers is a factor in analysts' compensation, then the potential for biased recommendations remains, even if regulators remove analysts' incentives to promote their firms' stock offerings by effectively separating research departments from underwriting departments.
